Dominic Johnson’s research examined how societies and political leaders seek and interpret victory and defeat in international relations, and how these interpretations shape political outcomes and democratic processes. Rather than focusing solely on material results, his work highlights the role of psychological biases, prior beliefs, and narrative framing in determining whether international crises are remembered as successes or failures.
A central output of this research was the book “Failing to Win: Victory and Defeat in International Relations,” with Prof. Dominic Tierney. Using the Cuban Missile Crisis as a key case study, the project showed how the perception of an unequivocal U.S. victory was consolidated less by objective outcomes than by expectations, framing, and the management of public opinion. The analysis was extended through comparative case studies, including the Tet Offensive, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the “War on Terror”, offering a broader framework for understanding how political victories and defeats are socially constructed.
This research bridges political science, psychology, and biology, reflecting a growing recognition that insights into human decision-making and cognitive bias are essential for understanding political behavior. By examining how leaders, media, and the public process information in times of crisis, Dominic Johnson’s work sheds light on vulnerabilities in democratic systems and the societal consequences of distorted perceptions of success and failure, with continuing importance today.